Revisiting the Question Concerning (Theological) Contextualization

Lester Edwin J. Ruiz
ruiz@ats.edu

Part of

(Essays in Honor of Fumitaka Matsuoka),
edited by Eleazar S. Fernandez

Situating Contextualization

Essentially, contextualization, particularly theological contextualization exercised under the sign of Christianity, is concerned with how the Gospel and culture—broadly and contingently conceived—relate to one another across space, time, and place. By definition, as much as in practice, contextualization cannot be extricated from the diversity and plurality of personal, political, historical, and sacred being that marks human experience.
Biblically, theologically, and pastorally, the metaphor for contextualization is not only the Incarnation but also *Kenosis*.

However, if the reader expects to find this essay engaging directly in theological contextualization, he or she will be disappointed. While important, that task is currently beyond my competence or interest. Mine is a more modest goal, at least in this essay: that is, to “re-visit” the question concerning contextualization, by which I mean simply identifying those issues with which one ought to be concerned if one wishes to embark on a project of theological contextualization adequate to the present world situation. In fact, the title of this essay is a play on Martin Heidegger’s reflection on technology, in which he explored “the conditions of understanding” under the dispensation of (technological) being. The connection with this essay is suggestive, if not metaphorical, but methodologically congenial: what are the conditions under which theological contextualization is being done today?—hence, the title of this essay, “the question concerning contextualization.”

Stephen Bevans’ four models of contextualization: translation, anthropological, praxis, and synthetic—provide a useful theoretical occasion for revisiting the question concerning contextualization. In fact, Bevans may be read as pointing to at least four underlying, inextricably-related characteristics of contextualization. First, contextualization is always and already an act of interpretation that combines thinking, feeling, and acting—involving speculative and practical forms of reason as well as desire; it is not mere cogitation. Second, contextualization is inextricably related to transformation, the creation and nurture of the
fundamentally new, which is also fundamentally better.\footnote{Manfred Halpern, translated by David Abalos, \textit{Transforming the Personal, Political, Historical and Sacred in Theory and Practice} (Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 2009).} Third, contextualization is almost always an event of competence: it has structure, process, and (human) agency. And finally, contextualization, particularly theological contextualization, is unavoidably “locational/positional.” Here, “the local” is not so much a question of “origin” or “trajectory” but a “site” of engagement; and “position” is not exclusively “subjective” but comprehensively “discursive” (an apparatus or dispositif, if you will)—both always and already intimately related to how one encounters the multistranded diversities and pluralities of space, time, and place—not unlike what Foucault called a “practice.”\footnote{Situated in the context of a post-positivist, post-empiricist, post-structuralist tradition, I deploy the term “practice” much in the same way Michel Foucault used the term dispositif—“a resolutely heterogeneous assemblage, containing discourses, institutions, architectural buildings, reglementary decisions, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, philanthropic propositions… said as well as non-said…” to signify the delightful and frustrating entanglements between “theory” (speculative reason) and “praxis” (practical reason), and their interplay with the personal, the political, the historical, and the sacred—in the service of transformation. See Michel Foucault, ed., Colin Gordon, “The Confession of the Flesh” in \textit{Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings} (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 194-228.}

In the Asian context, not excluding the Asian Diaspora, contextualization has been a vital part of the theological landscape. Thinkers including Shoki Coe, M.M. Thomas, D.T. Niles, Emerito Nacpil, Kosuke Koyama, and C.S. Song, as well as Virginia Fabella, Marianne Katoppo, and Maryjohn Mananzan, have pioneered what Huang Po Ho has called a “Contextual Theology movement in Asia.” In my own generation, we saw Minjung theology from Korea, Homeland theology and Theology of Chhut Thau Thin from Taiwan, theologies of struggle from the Philippines, and theologies of religion from India. Institutions like The Commision on Theological Concern of the Christian Conference of Asia, the Program for Theology and
Cultures in Asia (PTCA), the Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians (EATWOT), the Asian Church Women’s Conference (ACWC), and, the Association for Theological Education in South East Asia (ATESEA)—all may be understood as part of this vital movement. From the Asian Diaspora one might include the post-positivist, post-empiricist, post-colonial work of Eleazar Fernandez, Kwok Pui Lan, Tat-siong Benny Liew, and R. S. Sugirtharajah.

The Asianist contribution to the larger work of theological contextualization cannot be underestimated. Indeed, anyone who may be interested in developing both a “general” theory and “specific” practice of contextualization cannot evade having to engage these movements in (geographical) Asia and its Diaspora. As I will argue in this essay, however, one’s location and positionality are decisive, not to mention constitutive, not only in the selection of the manner in which one engages with these movements but also in the choices both of conversation partners and substantive, methodological, metatheoretical, and political/institutional problems. To put the matter simply, if polemically, being an Asian-in-Diaspora by choice, it would be the height of hubris to even begin to engage these “Asian” discourses from my current location because of the difficulties of representation implicated in the asymmetries of power, privilege, and access between the global south and the global north, as well as the very real limits of one’s capacity to understand or evaluate the competing or even incommensurable claims made by these Asianist thinkers. Less important, but by no means inconsequential, is that I am not entirely convinced that the production and reproduction of new knowledge where theological contextualization is concerned must necessarily travel the pathways of these pioneering works. A fuller, transdisciplinary, trans-Asianist engagement with different, if not wider global contexts, seems to
be an equally important “conditionality” for articulating a more robust understanding of theological contextualization. This is where I intentionally locate myself.  

The Context of Contextualization

Location, Positionality, Critique: The Methodological Importance of “Fallibility”

My own understanding of theological contextualization, first and foremost, is shaped fundamentally by my own context, where my location and positionality require an acknowledgement of the methodological importance of “fallibility” for understanding.

The intellectual production, reproduction, and representation in which I am engaged, as much as it may desire the sublime, is still the discourse of a privileged male flaneur, if not bricoleur, however personally innocent—and even though I might aspire towards a Gramscian “organic intellectual.” Michel Foucault observes that because all intellectual work is a passage through privilege, it is fraught with both dangers and possibilities: dangers because, on the one hand, we are a species marked not only by reason, or by freedom, but also by error; and, on the other hand, possibilities because the history of thought read as a critical philosophy appreciative of “fallibility” can become a “history of trials, an open-ended history of multiple visions and revisions, some more enduring than others.”

3 A more systematic discussion of my perspective can be found in Lester Edwin J. Ruiz, “Recovering the “Body Politics”: When the Question of “Race” and Power Migrates” in Dietrich Werner, David Esterline, Namsoon Kang, Joshua Raja, eds. Handbook of Theological Education in World Christianity: Theological Perspectives, Ecumenical Trends, Regional Surveys (Oxford: Regnum Books International, 2010), 85-103.

Contextualization, in fact, is such a form of production, reproduction, and representation. Here, recognition of location, not to mention positionality and maneuver, is not only politically necessary given the radical plurality of human history; it is also methodologically decisive for the production and reproduction of knowledge as a passage to transformation.

The affirmation of self-critical accountability rests in no small measure on an affirmation of the necessity of a kind of contextualization that is constantly challenged by what in my earlier work, following many of Latin American theologians of liberation, I called the “hermeneutical privilege of the poor and oppressed,” but which, I now want to argue, is unavoidably shaped, not to mention inspired, by the “hermeneutical significance of the victim.”

Jacques Derrida notes that a “victim” is “one who cannot even protest… [who] cannot even identify the victim as victim… [who] cannot even present himself or herself as such. He or she is totally excluded or covered over by language, annihilated by history.”

Derrida goes on to note that being a “victim” involves a certain kind of unreadability that stems from the violence of foreclosure, exclusion, all of history being a conflictual field of forces in which it is a matter of making unreadable, excluding, of positing by excluding, of imposing a dominant force by excluding… not only by marginalizing, by setting aside the victims, but also by doing so in such a way that no trace remains of the victims, so that no one can testify to the fact that they are victims or so that they cannot even testify to it themselves.

Derrida invokes the image of “cinders” which is a “trope that comes to take the place of everything that disappears without leaving an identifiable trace.” The difference between the trace “cinder” and other traces, according to Derrida, is that the body of which cinders is the

---


6 Ibid.
trace has totally disappeared; it has totally lost its contours, its form, its colors, its natural termination; it can no longer be identified, and forgetting itself is forgotten.7

I am convinced that one of the religio-moral dimensions, not to mention challenges, of the project of contextualization today is not only the discovery of how contextualization is embodied and/or situated but also the clarification of where the hope that animates it lies. It is particularly critical to explore this embodiment and hope in the context of this forgetfulness of victimization—something which Gayatri Spivak very early on explored in her thoughtful piece, “Can the Subaltern speak?” We need not only to find again the power of a transformative philosophy of contextualization but also to articulate the conditions of its possibility as a transformative practice. It is not only important to proclaim the legitimacy of the struggles of the marginalized and excluded against their victimization, but also to nurture and defend their struggles as the expression of their hope, not only for liberation but for liberative meaning, significance, and change. At the same time, it is critical to be mindful that while these expressions, at their best, are ruptures in the geographies of tradition that give birth to our own desires for contextualization, our own responses, at their worst, often colonize the struggles and hopes to which the marginalized, the excluded, and the victims aspire. In other words, how “fallibility” becomes methodologically necessary for theological contextualization, is a task to which one must always attend.

Moreover, part of what is at stake is finding new and better languages for struggle and hope (which is part of the discursive strategies of contextualization) which give birth to new and

7 Ibid.
better understandings and practices of contextualization. Both the context of and challenge for contextualization is to move towards the cultivation of what Foucault long ago called the “(insurrection of) subjugated knowledges”—discursive strategies and formations that have been conceptually, historically, philosophically, and institutionally excluded or eclipsed from theorizing heretofore—in the hope that they will contribute to both new knowledge, practice and discursive proximity. Here, genealogy yields to cartography, by which I mean the strategic deployment of local knowledges, the goal of which is to illumine, if not understand, alternative pathways to biblical, theological, and pastoral practice.

**Diaspora, Global Capital (or Empire), and Strangeness**

Second, my understanding of theological contextualization is shaped fundamentally by my historical experience of Diaspora, global capital, or empire as the formative grounds for strangeness, which is a condition of possibility for contextualization.

In his analysis of modern international politics and global capitalism, Michael Dillon notes that states as regimes of sovereignty and governmentality together with transnational capitalism and the environmental degradation of the planet have not only rendered millions of people radically endangered strangers in their own homes, but have criminalized or anathemized them in the places to which they have been forced to seek refuge. The modern international state system, in fact, is a *panopticon* of manufactured estrangement.


In the Philippine context, this estrangement is clearly demonstrated by the migration of Filipinos, today numbering over ten million, to other parts of the planet. Such migration is characterized not only by dispersal, displacement, and dislocation, but also of what Nikos Papastergiadis has innovatively and insightfully called, turbulence, suggesting by its use not mere motion, activity, or movement, but disruptive, unpredictable, volatile speed.

Moreover, the experience of “Diaspora” is not only about the dispersal, displacement, and dislocation of those “outside” the homeland. In fact, Diaspora dissolves not only the geopolitical, geostrategic, and territorial boundaries of “inside” and “outside,” but also their epistemological and ontological foundations. The Filipino Diaspora today is emblematic of a more comprehensively human condition that has produced new forms of belonging and identity as well as novel understandings of contemporary politics and culture. Diaspora evokes and provokes images of “border crossings” as well as invasions, of estrangements as well as of hybridities. It reveals global de-territorializing trajectories as well as local re-territorializing surges or insurgencies, especially under the conditions of transnational capital.

---


12 Ibid.
underscores contradictions and antagonisms, while intensifying the asymmetries of political, economic, and cultural structures and processes.”

The reality of “Diaspora” also raises a question not only about subjecthood, but also about subjectivity. This is the question of “the Subject:” not only who the subject is, but also what being a subject entails.14 The contested plurality of subjects and subjectivities pre-supposed by a “Diaspora” directs us not only to the question “What is to be done?” but also to the questions of “Who we are, what we hope for, and where we go?” In short, “What does it mean to be a people under the conditions of turbulent, volatile dispersal, displacement, and dislocation?”

Posing the issue as a question of community places theological contextualization at the heart of the struggles for transformation and in the context of the “hermeneutical significance of the victim.”

The reality of “Diaspora” also identifies the locus of struggle and hope at the intersection of self, other, and world. Of no small methodological and political significance, locating the question at the nexus of a peoples’ cultural practices—defined broadly as those concrete, sensuous realities embodied in rhetorical forms, gestures, procedures, modes, shapes, genres of everyday life: discursive formations and/or strategies, if you will, which are radically contingent arenas of imagination, strategy, and creative maneuver15—not only challenges the narrow confines of conventional understandings of struggle and hope, but also foregrounds their most

13 Nevzat Soguk, States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
comprehensive point of departure: a peoples’ pluralistic, and therefore always and already contradictory, antagonistic and agonistic histories, which are expressed in their stories, songs, poetry, and arts; embodied in their political struggles; and articulated in their economic institutions. Another way of stating the point is to suggest that “Diaspora” ruptures the pretensions of modernity’s appetite for intellectual idealism as the unitary foundation for human thought and action and re-positions them as articulations of the “interstitial.”

It is here that the “nativist” temptation is most forcefully raised. The work of scholars like Kwok Pui Lan and Tat-Siong Benny Liew, in fact, may be interpreted as suggesting that contextualization needs to move through its Asianist, if not Asian-centric pre-occupations, to engage with a radically-extended notion of “Asian” which goes beyond a homogenous or unitary notion arising not only out of its multistranded contexts, but also will have multiple, intersectional accounts: biological, cultural, psychic, and political. This abbreviated, admittedly oversimplified, summary of the “nativist” temptation that assumes a somewhat geographically-essentialist understanding of “the Asian” describes the fundamental divide between the proponents of “Asian as social construction” and the proponents of “Asian as biology” that continues to cast its long, if epistemologically-flawed, shadow on present-day discourses on contextualization. Moreover, it suggests that the discussion on contextualization cannot be extricated from socio-historical and physicalist/geographical considerations of “the Asian,”


17 As Brah and Phoenix note, the concept of intersectionality signifies “the complex, irreducible, varied, and variable effects which ensue when multiple axis [sic] of differentiation—economic, political, cultural, psychic, subjective and experiential—intersect in historically specific contexts.” Diaspora is such a reality. Brah and Phoenix, Ibid., 76.
precisely because the perspectives noted previously rely on Asianist (read racialized) physical, morphological, and geographical traits assumed to be “ontologically-different.” It also points to ongoing discussions, as in the work of Kwok, Liew, and Fernandez, that the notion of “Asian” not only continues to change over time, but also that contextualization (in the Asian context) may be more productively understood by the “effects” of this “contingent Asian” rather than by its already established conceptually-dominant definitions—hence, the methodological importance of “Diaspora.”

If “Diaspora” is the geographic stratégic condition of contextualization, then the strangeness that it creates is its methodological occasionality, alongside the Stranger—the Other—who embodies such strangeness, which is its methodological and religio-moral challenge. For indeed, “Diaspora,” as a creature of both modernity and postmodernity, methodologically radicalizes the experience of the Stranger or of Otherness in our time, and the existence of the Stranger in our midst raises for us the problems, prospects, and possibilities of both fundamentally new and better forms of knowledge and being, as well as of their interpretations. Similarly, strangeness, not to mention marginalization, it seems, is a condition of possibility both for community and interpretation: it is its constitutive outside. At the same time, if the Stranger is the constitutive outside, then its constitutive inside is hospitality. Because hospitality—the inclusion of the Stranger into a community not originally his or her own—is that which “arrives

---

18 The modern-postmodern divide is a profoundly contested one. By placing them in proximity, as I do in this essay, I want to suggest that these structures of meaning are best understood in both their continuities and discontinuities of method, cultural form, and political practice. Thus, I understand modernity and postmodernity less as periodizations and more as “conditions,” “sensibilities,” and “practices.” My own orientation, sensibility, and location are probably more congenial with the theory and practice of postcoloniality than with modernity or postmodernity. See, for example, Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, eds., The Post-Colonial Studies Reader (New York: Routledge, 1995).
at the borders, in the initial surprise of contact with an other, a stranger, a foreigner”\(^{19}\) it ruptures the boundaries that seek to contain migration and immigration in the name of state sovereignty, if not national integrity. It asks of us how we treat the stranger in our midst; and in that question, our identities begin to be articulated.

Of course, danger lies in the fact that both the Stranger and the giver of hospitality are not immune to the desire or temptation for “sameness” or uniformity—or even coercion and domination—even as the long experience of the condition of strangeness and hospitality often breeds certain fetishes for such strangeness and hospitality, including desires for the exotic. Moreover, hospitality does not always aspire towards genuine compassion or unconditional plenitude. Hospitality itself, when implicated in the perpetuation of power and privilege, tends to cast its long shadow on the struggle for a “genuine” hospitality that seeks to offer both the Stranger and the giver of hospitality the opportunity to live well together in the context of their shared differences. Indeed, the very structure of hospitality often must posit the existence of strangers “in need of hospitality,” requiring therefore, the legitimation of structures and processes that exclude before they include. Such exclusionary logics, for example of race, gender, and class, migrate on to the structures of “hospitality” without being overcome or transformed. Put differently, one must be open to the possibility that strangeness and hospitality (i.e., “Diaspora”) are necessary though insufficient conditions for the creation and nurture of radically inclusive communities of struggle and hope. Hence, writing from the perspective of the religio-moral, contextualization requires that we gesture toward resistance and solidarity. At the same time,

since the religio-moral cannot be extricated from the methodological, the fundamental question for contextualization is: how can it be rendered methodologically (read “structurally”) hospitable? What may be said of the Stranger and of hospitality are equally true for theological contextualization.

Elsewhere I have argued that Diaspora is not a stranger to global capital and empire. Here, let me note only in passing, its importance as a context for contextualization.

Global capital cannot be reduced to “empire,” but neither can “empire” be extricated from transnational capital. Both, whatever their raisons d’être, are fundamentally articulations of power. In fact, both transnational capital and “empire” are implicated in a narrative of modernity that in turn reproduces global capital and “empire.” By “modernity” I mean, following Richard K. Ashley’s lead, the “multifaceted historical narrative rooted in the Enlightenment, dominant in Western society, expressed in rationalist theory, and centering on the progressive unfolding of universalizing reason and social harmony via science, technology, law, and the state.” Where Ashley assists us in identifying the philosophical contours of this multifaceted historical narrative, Anthony Giddens provides a useful institutional cartography of modernity, arguing in The Consequences of Modernity that there are four institutional dimensions of modernity: capitalism, i.e., capital accumulation in the context of competitive labor and product...


markets; industrialism, i.e., the transformation of nature or the development of the ‘created environment’; surveillance, i.e., the control of information and social supervision; and, military power, i.e., the control of the means of violence in the context of the industrialization of war.²²

What is important to understand about the narrative of modernity is its logocentric disposition, the tendency to regard all thought, feeling, and action as grounded in some fundamental identity, principle of interpretation, or necessary thinking substance which is itself regarded as unproblematic, nonhistorical, and hence, in no need of critical accounting. This principle of interpretation and practice is conceived as existing in itself as a foundation or origin of history’s making, not a contingent effect of political practices within history. Such a disposition has become a principle of articulation, if not a ground for domination that creates and re-creates human life in its own image.

Hence, William Connolly rightly notes that the West at its imperial best, the US being a clear example, arrogates to itself the power and privilege of the interrogator, consistently negating or demeaning the role of other peoples in civilizational, socio-cultural, political and economic history, while claiming the same history as an exclusively Western possession.²³ At the same time the West is very quick to hyperbolize and render pathological the imperial powers,


practices and ambitions of others: All that is good, it is argued, is of Western origin and all that is wrong is part of the larger tragic human condition which is external to the West.

Thus, any project of contextualization cannot avoid addressing the dangers of being absorbed into this US-led western project.24

At the same time, it is no longer sufficient, empirically if not analytically or philosophically, to explain “the world” in terms of US-led “empire.” There is enough evidence to suggest that the very states that have historically challenged US hegemony, for example, China, India, and even the EEU, are themselves engaged in their own versions of “empire-building,” albeit within the larger frame of global capital. This multi-polar view of the world is enough to suggest that the fundamental problematique to which theological contextualization needs to attend are the dynamics of power and privilege that accompany these multiple realities of empire-building, and not only the dominant historical form that they take.

Challenges to Contextualization

The future of theological contextualization as a discursive formation and strategy may require at least three tasks. First, contextualization needs to continue to recognize, affirm, and articulate different ways of producing and reproducing knowledge (epistemology): here, not only is this about situated knowledges and partial perspectives, but also of subjugated and insurrectionary knowledges and agents of knowledges, and the ways in which they are related. Even more important, however, is the need to consistently focus, among other things, on the

fundamental situatedness and partial character of our ways of organizing thinking, feeling and acting, and on the necessity, if not desirability, of rethinking the relationship between reason and desire, and knowledge and politics, in the construction of interpretive frameworks for theological contextualization that demonstrate the mutually constitutive rather than oppositional relationship between them.\(^\text{25}\) Here it will be important to pay very close attention to the epistemological implications of, say Giorgio Agamben’s work on “apparatus” (and certainly of Foucault on genealogy), particularly as they frame the realities of “situated knowledges and partial perspectives.”\(^\text{26}\)

Second, theological contextualization needs to continue to recognize, affirm, and articulate different modes of being (ontology). Here discourses on the “body” are useful guides to understand what is at stake. For example, not only is this about thinking, feeling, and acting as relational practices, but also about “volatile bodies,” i.e., of re-figuring and re-inscribing bodies, of moving through and beyond the conventional divide of gender as socially-contructed, on the one hand, and of sex as biologically-given, on the other hand, to “our bodies our selves.”\(^\text{27}\) Feminists have suggested that the “male (or female) body can no longer be regarded as a fixed, 


concrete substance, a pre-cultural given. It has a determinate form only by being socially
inscribed… as a socio-historical ‘object’.” They continue,

The body can no longer be confined to biological determinants, to an immanent
‘factitious’, or unchanging social status. It is a political object par excellence; its forms,
capacities, behaviours, gestures, movements, potential are primary objects of political
contestation. As a political object, the body is not inert or fixed. It is pliable and plastic
material, which is capable of being formed and organized.28

One may ask, therefore, “How does one contextualize concrete, sensuous bodies?” But perhaps
more important, we will need to ask what, how, and where are the *embodied* forms of theological
contextualization?

Third, theological contextualization needs to continue to recognize, affirm, and articulate
different empowering practices (politics). Not only is this about the importance and power of
self-definition, self-valuation, nor of self-reliance and autonomy, but also about transformation
and transgression, of finding safe places and voices in the midst of difference, and of making the
connections. Chandra Talpade Mohanty summarizes this point quite well. She notes,

…third world women’s writings on feminism have consistently focused on (1) the
idea of the simultaneity of oppressions as fundamental to the experience of social
and political marginality and the grounding of feminist politics in the histories of
racism and imperialism; (2) the crucial role of a hegemonic state in
circumscribing their/our daily lives and survival struggles; (3) the significance of
memory and writing in the creation of oppositional agency; and (4) the
differences, conflicts, and contradictions internal to third world women’s

Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Paul Rabinow, ed., *The Foucault Reader* (New
York: Random House, 1984), 83. See also Michel Foucault, *The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan
organizations and communities. In addition, they have insisted on the complex interrelationships between feminist, antiracist, and nationalist struggles…

**Contextualization as World-Forming Practices:**

**Dialogue, Diversity, and the Creation of “One World, Many Worlds”**

I suggested at the beginning of this essay that contextualization is fundamentally a hermeneutical event, an act of understanding, which arises in the “fusion of horizons” (*Horizontverschmelzung*)—or of bringing that which is “strange” into proximity with that which is “not-strange”—which is a relationship that is constituted both by the reality of history and of historical understanding. Hans-Georg Gadamer called this “effective historical consciousness” (*Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein*), where the “reality of history” presents itself “so much in terms of our own selves that there is no longer a question of self and other.”

It is within this hermeneutical *practice* that contextualization must be articulated. What elements are required for such a re-articulation?

My intuition returns to the ancient notion of dialogue (dia-*logos*) or moving together through multiple universes of meaning—understood as the “transformation of play into

---


31 I am grateful to Professor Charles Amjad-Ali of Luther Seminary in Minneapolis, Minnesota for drawing my attention to dialogue as more than a “conversation” between two individuals.
structure.” Here dialogue has a four-fold process that moves from the evanescent immediacy of proximal engagement (“the encounter”), to the narrative of biography (“my story”), then to history (“our people’s story”), and finally to cosmology (“the story of the universe”). To be sure, this is not an inexorable teleological unfolding of some Hegelian Geist, but rather the “play of differences” where dialogical ruptures often result in unexpected historical repetitions or sometimes profound Nietzschean-like repudiations of hallowed traditions, but where the encounter with the “totally-transpersonal-other-than-me” is always mediated through the engagement with what Emmanuel Levinas describes as the Other, and where the way through the Logos (or logoi) cannot evade fallibility, and therefore, must affirm the self-critical accountability of those engaged in theological contextualization.

I am almost convinced that the practice of contextualization will work only if there is a genuine identification with particular “communities of transformation” where the play of differences is affirmed as constitutive of being-in-a-community-of-shared-difference, and where this “shared difference,” understood as “conviviality,” reaches not only for diversity but for “radical inclusion,” where persons see all of humankind (and, possibly all of creation) as possible fellow sojourners towards a world of meaning and significance who realize that their destinies are inextricably-woven to their capacities to learn how to live together on the one planet that is our common heritage (the ethical demand), and who intentionally move towards a common and abiding refusal to understand self, other, and world as being constitutively dependent on the gaze of a subject-of-the-world (the philosophical demand). For while the human condition arises out

32 See Gadamer, 102ff., fn 30.
of “difference” and returns to difference, its normative, if not necessary challenge, is not how the
difference can be overcome, but rather how and under what conditions is it possible for us not
only to live together, but to live together well finally.  

Put differently, contextualization is not an end in itself; it is a passage through difference
into living well differently. Here, difference and “limits” embrace, not unlike life and death, Eros
and Thanatos. Thus, I am more than convinced that theological contextualization, which by its
very structure is a fallible, if not fumbling (i.e., contingent), Gadamerian “conversation,” requires
a commitment to some minimal form of “mutuality” or reciprocity and self-criticality that
intentionally and purposively reaches from the ground of humility for the “fundamentally new
which is also fundamentally better.”

Moreover, contextualization is not only a contingent conversation that aspires to the
ethical and the philosophical. In fact, it is a creative act of forming a world. Gadamer brings the
“transformation of play into structure” and the “fusion of horizons” into discursive proximity—
both of which constitute our (human) “being-in-the-world.” It is here where the significance of
forming a world arises for “contextualization.” Not only do these acts of interpretation cast
suspicions on construals of grand theories of contextualization as “totality grasped as [an
indistinct] whole,” but more important, they also force such theorizing into a process of
differentiation and formation that “maintains a crucial reference to the world’s horizon as a space

---

33 This is how I read Jacques Derrida’s The Last Interview: Learning to Live Finally, translated by
Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Nass (Hoboken: Melville House Press, 2007), where one’s death, when
understood as the quintessential aporia which is both limit and rupture (Spivak), presents the possibility
of being thrown back on to life not as mere existence but as living fully well.
of human relations… of meaning held in common… of signification or possible signification”\(^{34}\)
that no longer conceives of theological contextualization as merely an object of representation.

When articulated against this multi-stranded background, dialogue and diversity as
conditions of possibility press towards a non-representational \textit{practice} that is simultaneously
critical interpretation, effective performance, purposive formation, and transformative
contextualization.\(^{35}\) Here dialogue, diversity, and the formation of “one world, many worlds,” as
well as of “the play of differences,” conviviality, the dialogical non-binary commitment to
unconditional and principled openness and reciprocity, the goal of transformation or the
“creation of the fundamentally new which is also fundamentally better”—all provide the
fundamental elements for theological contextualization.

\textbf{Conclusion: Contextualization as Transformation}

I want to conclude by returning to the fundamental and necessary challenge that gives
rise to the question of “contextualization” with which I began this essay: the need for biblical,
theological, and pastoral contextualization resting on the metaphors of both Incarnation and
Kenosis. The need is as simple as it is profound. The human condition under the sign of
“Diaspora” is essentially about the familiar becoming strangely unfamiliar with uneven
consequences depending on one’s location and positionality. This “strangeness” which some

\(^{34}\) Jean-Luc Nancy’s path breaking distinction between globalization and \textit{mondialisation}
illustrates the methodological move I am making. See especially, Jean-Luc Nancy, \textit{The Creation of the
World or Globalization}, translated by Francois Raffoul and David Pettigrew (Albany: State University of
New York, 2007), 2ff. See also, R.B.J. Walker, \textit{After the Globe: Before the World} (New York: Routledge,
2010).

\(^{35}\) The terminology of this four-fold practice is adapted from Charles Foster, et al, \textit{Educating
would prefer to call “estrangement” requires both interpretation and transformation if one wants not only to live but to live well. Unfortunately, what is becoming clear to me is that the assertion of the desirability or normative character of “theological contextualization” is almost always accompanied by a fundamental subterranean epistemological temptation to “represent” the world as an act of a “subject of history.” The conditions of our world—even this postcolonial world—so powerfully captured in Martin Heidegger’s image of the “the age of the world as picture,” conspire to preserve this temptation. Reality is surrendered to the determination of a subject, particularly of a “possessive individual.”36 Such representation is not only the quintessential repetition of the Cartesian aspiration for that fundamentum inconcussum that guarantees knowledge, but also its consequences have become fundamentally flawed, if unsustainable, in a postmodern, postcolonial world where both incommensurability and the possibility of understanding cannot be evaded, and the asymmetry of power and privilege resists transformation.

My wager, at least at the intuitive and philosophical level, is that by bringing contextualization into discursive proximity with transformation as “the creation of the fundamentally new that is also fundamentally better,” understood as a particular kind of practice, the inherently ontotheological or representational character of our inherited notions of contextualization might be greatly reduced to a place where the locations and positionalities of

critique become questions not of epistemology, but of (ontological) worldliness. Here contextualization is not only an “impossible possibility,” it becomes a necessary strategy for the survival of the world.

Such ontotheological assertions betray a fundamental subterranean epistemological dichotomy between “church” and “world” (theology and human science) which functions as a “Trojan Horse” for the privileging of the former in theological contextualization. This is the quintessential repetition of that heresy around the Incarnation with which the Christian churches have wrestled throughout its almost 2000-year history. I want to suggest that for as long as the dichotomy is maintained, “contextualization” will simply be a principle that regulates Christian thought and practice, a creature of incremental change that undermines the possibility of fundamental change itself. For Christians, this bringing into proximity can only be achieved by moving from their onto-theological assertions to their “worldly” locations and positionalities.

It was Dietrich Bonhoeffer who started me on my theological journey towards a non-representational contextualization when he declared in his Letters and Papers from Prison, dated July 21, 1944, the profound this-worldliness of Christianity. It may be that Christians today must aspire to this Diesseitigkeit des Christentums not as an assertion of the eternal relevance of the mission of Christianity and therefore, the imperative for contextualization, but rather, as Christian faith’s unavoidable and necessary arche and telos—where the practice of contextualization is one of the key strategic conditions for becoming finally “fully human” in a

37 This is the burden of Martin Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology” and “The Age of the World Picture.” Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, translated by William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977). Gadamer addresses similar concerns about the ontotheological character of modern philosophy in terms of his notions of “effective historical consciousness,” “the fusion of horizons,” and, “transformation of play into structure.”
non-representational “one world, many worlds.” This may prove to be Christianity’s greatest challenge yet.